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1. Introduction 
 
On 7 June 1919, two days after his 36th birthday, John Maynard Keynes, resigned from the United Kingdom’s 
Treasury team at the Paris Peace Conference negotiating what was to become the Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 
June 1919. The details of Keynes’ already lofty intellectual stature and of the political environments in Britain, 
France, and the United States at the time can be gleaned from Robert Skidelsky’s, and from numerous other, 
biographies of the man.1 Upon his resignation, Keynes penned a small book, published in 1920. Called The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace, he prefaced it as follows:2 
 
The writer of this book was temporarily attached to the British Treasury during the war and was their official 
representative at the Paris Peace Conference up to June 7, 1919; he also sat as deputy for the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer on the Supreme Economic Council. He resigned from these positions when it became evident that 
hope could no longer be entertained of substantial modification in the draft Terms of Peace. The grounds of his 
objection to the Treaty, or rather to the whole policy of the Conference towards the economic problems of 
Europe, will appear in the following chapters. They are entirely of a public character, and are based on facts 
known to the whole world. 
 
J. M. KEYNES. 
KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
November, 1919. 
                                                
1. Skidelsky (1983). Of course, one may also consult wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Maynard_Keynes [accessed 14 October 2011]. 
2. Keynes (1920); also see Keynes (1922). 
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 Thereupon, Keynes lay out, in so compelling a fashion that neither his argument nor his evidence has ever been 
seriously challenged, the case for why the allies’ Terms of Peace to be imposed on Germany were physically and 
financially impossible to fulfill. The whole of the book can be read in a single, focused three-hour session, but many 
a reader soon will submit to Keynes’ passionate avalanche of striking, overwhelming, and eventually mind-numbing 
detail: One begins to skip the painful detail of how the victors intended to punish the loser and reads the book in 
two. 
 Keynes writes (Keynes, 1920, pp. 250-251): 
 
If we take the view that for at least a generation to come Germany cannot be trusted with even a modicum of 
prosperity, that while all our recent Allies are angels of light, all our recent enemies, Germans, Austrians, 
Hungarians, and the rest, are children of the devil, that year by year Germany must be kept impoverished and 
her children starved and crippled, and that she must be ringed round by enemies; then we shall reject all the 
proposals of this chapter, and particularly those which may assist Germany to regain a part of her former 
material prosperity and find a means of livelihood for the industrial population of her towns. But if this view of 
nations and of their relation to one another is adopted by the democracies of Western Europe, and is financed by 
the United States, heaven help us all. If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, 
vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the 
forces of Reaction and the despairing convulsions of Revolution, before which the horrors of the late German 
war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilisation and the progress of our 
generation. 
 
 Such were “the economic consequence of the peace” indeed: Restrictions on world trade, hyper-inflation, the 
depression years in the United States and in Europe, the rise of Hitler, the pogrom that became the Holocaust, and 
war on such a calamitous scale that “the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing.” How prescient. 
 Even though it be true that Keynes’ efforts at sanity failed, one cannot think of a more dramatic demonstration 
of what good economists have ever done for peace. 
 Alas, in late 1944, Henry Morgenthau, the then-Secretary of the United States Treasury, advocated a “harsh 
peace” for Germany. His eponymous Morgenthau Plan foresaw the partitioning of Germany into several entities, 
stripping it of its most valuable raw materials and industrial assets in the West—namely, the coal deposits and the 
iron and steel industry in the Ruhr area—depriving it of any industrial prowess at all. He argued for the complete 
pastoralization of Germany, reducing the people of the geographic heartland of Europe to mere tillers of the land. 
 News of a somewhat modified plan agreed by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill on 16 September 1944 
leaked, and then led to a redoubling of Germany’s, albeit already-doomed, war effort.3 Following Victory Day, plans 
to deindustrialize Germany proceeded apace: Its remaining factories were dismantled, parts, machinery, and 
equipment shipped abroad, patents expropriated, research forbidden, and—in a mad dash—useful engineers and 
scientists spirited out of the country just as soon as any of the Allies could lay their hands on them.4 Despite the 
                                                
3. See chapter 6 in Brauer and van Tuyll (2008). 
4. The story goes that when Soviet and U.S. warplanes met in the skies over Korea, during the Korean war, the 
pilots were mutually perplexed about the sophistication and similarity of the aircraft, the MIG15 and the F86: It 
appears both jets were designed, in no small part, by postwar access to German documents as well as post-Nazi 
 3 
Bretton Woods agreement, in July 1944, to set up a troika of global institutions—the International Monetary Fund, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—
Europe’s economies declined postwar. It looked as if Keynes’ Economic Consequences of the Peace might be 
repeated yet again. 
 But saner heads prevailed—eventually. In the waning moments of the European war, the American presidency 
changed hands. Roosevelt had died, and Truman assumed the Presidency on 12 April 1945. Morgenthau’s term as 
Secretary of the Treasury ended on 22 July 1945. Even as the deindustrialization of Germany went forward as 
initially planned, in a famous speech delivered in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946, Truman’s new Secretary of State, 
James Byrnes, took a dismal view of the effects. So did former president Herbert Hoover, in a series of reports 
penned in 1947. As Germans scraped by on starvation diets, Stalin’s Soviet Union was a rising power. Already it 
held eastern Germany and, as from 24 June 1948, it was to blockade the Western allies’ rail and road access to the 
partitioned Berlin, prompting them to fly in relief supplies and sharply escalate the incipient Cold War. The writing 
on the wall seemed clear: An economically strengthened, resurgent Germany either could be part of a new Western 
alliance or be incorporated into a Soviet one. As in the 1920s, it was feared that hungry mouths would flee to those 
who promised to feed them. 
 In July 1947, Truman thus came to abolish the punitive measures imposed on Germany, and his new Secretary 
of State, General George C. Marshall (Byrnes had resigned his post in January that year) formulated what would 
become the eponymous Marshall Plan, in effect from 1948 to 1952. Not blind to its political purpose, a strange kind 
of peace economics had been crafted, for which Marshall would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.5 
 So there we have the peace economist, in the person of Keynes, and peace economics, or at least nonwar 
economics, in the person of Marshall. This sets the stage for two strands one might investigate: One concerning a 
flurry of books by prominent economists on the problem of peace, the other, a flurry of activity by bureaucrats and 
politicians to secure it. Among the former are such famed names—among economists at least—as A.C. Pigou, 
Kenneth Boulding, and Lionel Robbins, Englishmen all, each penning one or more books detailing their thoughts on 
the matter.6 Among today’s luminaries, economics Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, together with co-author Linda 
Bilmes, is probably the outstanding voice regarding the cost of war.7 Indeed, about a dozen economics Nobel 
Laureates, Stiglitz among them, grace the board of Economists for Peace and Security in the United States.8 As 
happened to Keynes, the political establishment mostly ignores them. But, again as Keynes, this does not render 
their views false. 
                                                                                                                                                       
scientific, engineering, and design refugees/migrants, one part having gone West, the other East. Ample 
documentation is available on the internet but see, e.g., the illustration in Budiansky (2004, p. 372). Much the same 
was true of rocketry and nuclear engineering; see Rhodes (1995) or google “Operation Paperclip” and “Operation 
Osoaviakhim,” respectively. 
5. See the Nobel citation speech at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/press.html 
[accessed 14 October 2011]. 
6. Pigou (1916; 1920; 1921); Boulding (1945); Robbins (1950). See Coulomb (2004) for a history of economic 
thought on war and peace. 
7. Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008). 
8. See www.epsusa.org [accessed 14 October 2011]. 
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 On the bureaucratic-political side of things, the single-most often told story is that of Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schuman. Like Keynes, Monnet participated in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in Monnet’s case as an assistant 
to the French delegation. Like Keynes, he envisioned a pan-European economic cooperation zone. Like Keynes, he 
would be disappointed.9 Despite this, the French appreciated his good efforts and awarded him with the post of 
Deputy Secretary-General of the newly-founded League of Nations. Monnet was but 31 years old. He resigned four 
years later and devoted himself to international business and finance. He resurfaced during the early World War II 
years in positions of high influence in France, Britain, and the United States, urging Roosevelt to get on with an 
industrial armaments plan, the success of which led Keynes to credit him with shortening the war by a year.10 
Together with Robert Schuman—the Franco-German-Luxembourgian statesman, French Minister of Finance, of 
Foreign Affairs and, twice, Prime Minister of France—plans were crafted and introduced for what with many a twist 
and turn eventually would become today’s European Union. These plans were wholly based on a vision of a pan-
European economic union, so intricately interconnected, so tightly woven, so strongly bound, that European war 
would no longer be thinkable, nor indeed feasible. 
 
2. Defense, conflict, and security economics 
 
As an academic discipline, what has economics ever done for peace? Plenty, it turns out, even if the modern-day 
economics profession, certain luminaries notwithstanding, does not seem much interested in the topic. But just one 
comparative chart illustrates why the profession, and others, should care: Peace pays; violence costs (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Inflation- and purchasing power parity-adjusted per capita GDP, Botswana and Zimbabwe (I$; 
base year=2005). 
Source: Extracted from Penn World Table, v7. 
 
                                                
9. Although routinely described as “an economist,” Monnet received no economics training, nor in fact any 
post-secondary formal education at all. 
10. Mayne (1991, p. 117). It is difficult to find an original source for the statement attributed to Keynes, but one 
source may be http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2000/cheminade_fdr_monnet_2724.html#fnB1 [accessed 14 
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 It is not that Botswana is free of economic troubles, but that its peaceful politics facilitate or, at least, do not 
impede its economic advancement. The same of course cannot be said about its neighbor, Zimbabwe. 
 A brief history: In the post-World War II era, defense economics might be dated with the arrival of Robert 
McNamara in the Pentagon as U.S. Secretary of Defense. Defense economics deals with economic aspects of 
managing the defense sector and includes topics such as military R&D, procurement, and the defense industry (e.g., 
Gansler, 1980; 1989), military manpower and the debate over moving from conscription to an all-volunteer force 
(e.g., Ash, Hosek, and Warner, 2007; Poutvaara and Wagener, 2007), the use of game theory to understand the 
implications and to devise strategies to manage the then-ongoing nuclear arms race between the United States and 
the Soviet Union (e.g., Schelling, 1960; Harsanyi, 1965), and alliance theory, the theory of how alliances arise and 
function (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). The key conceptual idea is that defense economics deals with aspects 
internal to the defense establishment. However, this soon gave rise to extensions, such as debates over whether 
military R&D leads to civilian sector “spin-offs” (Ruttan, 2005; Brauer, 2007a; 2007b), whether military spending 
stimulates underperforming developing economics (Benoit, 1973; Faini, et al., 1984; Ball, 1988), and studies on the 
economic effect of military expenditure on subnational and national economies. For instance, military bases and 
arms manufacturers were (and are) unevenly distributed across the geography of the United States so that taxes 
raised in some states were expended in and benefitted other states. Geographically uneven military expenditure, in 
turn, could skew recruitment of military-related construction, engineering, scientific, consulting, and other work and 
therefore affect local and regional labor markets. At the national level, military expenditure implied financing by 
taxation or borrowing, with macroeconomic consequences. An extensive theoretical and empirical literature 
developed to appraise, for example, the short-term and long-term stimulatory or diversionary effects of military 
expenditure on national economic output. Whereas defense economics initially was internal to the defense 
establishment, it soon attracted independent, academic economists studying the potentially beneficial or adverse 
economy-wide effects of military expenditure per se. The field now might well be said to have broadened into 
military economics (e.g., Smith, 2009). 
 With the ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s, a series of brutal civil wars broke out during the 1990s, not 
only but especially in Africa, and led to an increased interest in conflict economics. Inasmuch as investments and 
activities by international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund 
were placed at risk, conflict economics, based on academic work by Jack Hirshleifer in particular,11 became both a 
catch-all as well as a euphemism. As a catch-all, it broadened the scope of academic work to consider any type of 
conflict between and among diverging interests. As such, conflict includes conflict within families, between firms 
and employees, firms and their suppliers, firms and their customers, conflict between vested interests for public 
sector largesse, and so on. Hirshleifer applied a “contest success function,” a mathematical description of the 
likelihood of succeeding in a contest, or conflict. Anderton and Carter’s 2009 textbook is a reflection of this, as is 
The Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Peace and Conflict, edited by Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012). Yet, 
                                                                                                                                                       
October 2011] which, in turn, references Mönick (1970). 
11. See, e.g., the essays in Hirshleifer (2001). 
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conflict economics is also a euphemism as, in practice, much of what conflict researchers address is highly violent, 
shockingly brutal, endemically entrenched, and sometimes genocidal. In addition, conflict economics—reflecting 
the orthodox, rational choice theory way of doing economics—prides itself on its positive rather than normative 
mode of analysis. The theoretical basis of conflict economics is the distinction between productive and unproductive 
activities within economic systems, first emphasized by Vilfredo Pareto in 1906: “The efforts of men are utilized in 
two different ways: They are directed to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the 
appropriation of goods produced by others,”12 later recast into the now familiar “guns” versus “butter” metaphor and 
now a staple of economics textbooks. In the late 1990s, conflict economics, having started out with much theorizing, 
became a vast empirical literature, especially on civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 1999; Caruso, 2010b).  
 Although there already had existed a long-standing literature on the economics of terrorism, in the wake of the 
terror attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, economists in recent years have paid increasing attention to 
forms of politically motivated violence other than war and civil war and, with it, to the cost of security beyond the 
traditionally understood defense. This has branched to encompass aspects such as high-seas piracy as well as to 
security-related costs borne by firms and private households and therefore has begun to sidle up to the economics of 
crime, a well-established field of study. Huge outlays on security in the private and public sectors are the result of 
defensive, deflective, or avoidance behavior. Security is understood as “a state of freedom from danger or threat,”13 
be it at the personal or supranational level, and as such must be paid for. Seeking security signals intent to insulate 
oneself, one’s family, and one’s property and assets from harm. In essence, this amounts to risk management. 
Although insurance may bring some peace of mind, security is not peace, and security economics (Brück, 2005) is 
not peace economics. 
 
3. Peace economics 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of peace economics is its normative aspect (Caruso, 2010a): How should the world 
look like, and what can be done to bring about a progressively more stable, peaceful state of the world? We thus 
define our subject matter as follows: Peace economics concerns the economic study and design of political, 
economic, and cultural institutions, their interrelations, and their policies to prevent, mitigate, or resolve any 
type of latent or actual destructive conflict within and between societies. Peace economics self-consciously 
studies not only “what is,” but also “what should be.” This normative character has been emphasized by Isard 
(1994), Arrow (1995), Coulomb, Hartley, and Intriligator (2008), and others. Peace economics is ecumenical in 
welcoming a variety of intellectual approaches. For example, within the orthodox domain of rational choice theory, 
one goal of microeconomists might be to study the conditions under which individuals choose to allocate time and 
other resources to constructive or destructive ends and what switch in degree or kind of conditions would call forth a 
corresponding switch in behavior. For example, it is well established that individuals may fall into violent behavior 
                                                
12. Pareto (1906 [1971], p. 341. 
13. Ringel and Tishler (2011, p. 108). 
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because of poor or unjust economic conditions.14 An economist might then be concerned with the political, 
economic, and cultural conditions that shape an individual’s motivation and means to engage in destructive 
behavior. The example as told thus far is positive (“what is”) and is filed under the rubric of conflict or crime 
economics. What pushes the example into peace economics is the normative aspect: to design institutions and 
policies that prevent, mitigate or resolve actual and potential destruction by influencing the choice behavior of 
individuals in favor of peace-creating habits. Peace economics thus openly welcomes and embraces one of the 
trenchant criticisms of orthodox economics: that behind the veil of positivism there lies a distinct normative view of 
the world. 
 Peace economics is not unlike engineering. The point is not merely to describe why bridges collapse or remain 
standing. Rather, the point is to derive and then apply principles such that only bridges will be built whose 
likelihood of collapse is near zero. Bridges are constructed in varying environments and to varying specifications. 
These include the soil is which a bridge is anchored, the wind velocities it is subject to, and the traffic it is expected 
to bear. Likewise, societies large and small operate in varying (and changing) environments. To be productive and to 
fulfill their economic purpose—the assurance of the livelihood of their population—
they need to be built to varying specifications. Among these are the construction of 
institutions and policies that minimize or prevent contest and unproductive (that is, 
wastefully destructive) activity.15 
 Post-World War II, Kenneth Boulding put this succinctly: “The economic 
problem of reconstruction is that of rebuilding the capital of society ... Reconstruction 
is merely a special case of economic progress. If we are to understand its problems 
thoroughly, we must examine what is meant by economic progress and try to discover 
how it comes about” (our emphases).16 By “capital” Boulding means assets, or things 
that, in time, yield income based on these assets. Human capital, of which formal 
education is one example, is one such asset. During periods of violence, its 
accumulation is delayed and its stock is depreciated or destroyed. Human capital needs 
to be rebuilt. Physical and financial capital are other forms of assets that need to be 
(re)constructed. Thus, peace economics becomes the centerpiece of development 
economics, and—as Boulding reminds us—of all of economics, for which society does 
not wish to progress further? For Boulding all economics is peace economics and all 
economists are peace economists17. Without development, there is no stable peace; 
                                                
14. A classic reference on relative deprivation theory is Gurr (1970). On the evidence for an inverse relationship 
between economic conditions and political violence see, e.g., Sambanis (2004); Blomberg, et al. (2004). On the 
relationship between economic conditions and crime see, e.g., Neumayer (2005). 
15. On productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, see Baumol (1990). On the economics of destruction, 
see, e.g., Vahabi (2011). 
16. Boulding (1945, pp. 4, 73). 
17 Interestingly, Léon Walras nominated himself for the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize. He was convinced that the 
study of economics was a means to promote the peaceful fraternity of states. See Sandmo (2007).  
Figure 2: A vulnerable 
virtuous cycle. 
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without stable peace, there is no long-term progress. Prosperity is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
peace, and peace is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for prosperity see Figure 2.)18 
 Following from the previous point one issue, among others, pertains to the concept of stability. Like an engineer 
who wants to build a stable bridge, peace economists want to establish stable, peaceful social systems. Boulding 
(1978) differentiates among stable (continuous) war, unstable war (war punctuated by occasional peace), unstable 
peace (peace punctuated by occasional war), and stable (continuous) peace. In medieval Genoa, for example, a 
strategy of mutual deterrence adopted by rival clans continuously generated mutual increases in military might. But 
in the long-term, their arms race equilibrium became unstable, leading Genoa first to social unrest and then to civil 
war (Greif, 2006). As in game theory, peace economics is concerned with the conditions that underpin the existence, 
uniqueness, and stability of social systems. Evidently, social systems are unstable, or else they would not oscillate 
between war and peace. Hence, we label Figure 2 as a vulnerable virtuous cycle, and one objective of peace 
economics is to identify and to mend vulnerabilities in the system. 
 Peace economics is not opposed to conflict economics. On the contrary, peace economics takes the positive 
approach as its starting point—we do need to describe, “What is”—but then pushes into the normative arena as well. 
Rather than to stand aloof from application to policy, peace economics investigates and invests in application to 
policy. One example comes from the debate on the “democratic peace” versus the “capitalist peace” in which the 
statistical evidence by now favors the latter.19 A normative implication is to let matters of political governance take 
care of themselves and, instead, attend to promote economic freedom: People who trade fight more rarely, regardless 
of the political arrangements of their societies.20 
 
4. Peace economics for the twenty-first century 
 
4.1 Conceptual framework 
 
In a recent article, two researchers write that “peace agreements are fragile” (Bove and Smith, 2011, p. 257). Indeed, 
depending on how one measures, between one-fourth to one-half of all recent civil wars that ended in peace flared 
up again, within a few years’ time, as war. Like engineering bridges, peace economics is not primarily about the 
prevention of failure (in the sense of suppressing failure) but about the creation of stable structures of peace. It is 
                                                
18. Belatedly, the United Nations and the World Bank Group have accepted these conclusions. For example, 
only in 2009 did the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) acknowledge that the Millennium Development 
Goals are impossible to fulfill in the absence of peace, and only in 2011 did the World Bank acknowledge, in its 
World Development Report 2011, that development cannot be achieved in the absence of peace. To quote the 
UNGA: “Although the linkage between armed violence and development is not explicit in the Millennium 
Development Goals, they offer entry points for development agencies to consider. Objectives such as reducing 
poverty, ensuring maternal health and promoting education are all associated with effective armed violence 
prevention and reduction initiatives. Nevertheless … there is no Millennium Development Goal that specifically 
deals with conflict, violence and insecurity” (UN General Assembly, 5 August 2009, item #33, p. 11, A/64/228). 
19. See, e.g., Gartzke (2005); HSRP (2011, chapter 2). 
20 See Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982), Robst, et al. (2007). 
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about irreversibility, invulnerability, and the fool-proof, unconditional viability of peaceful social systems. 
 We can now outline our conceptual framework, and the role of peace economics within it, as follows. We 
define any community of any size as a social system. It consists of political, economic, and cultural domains. 
Violence is one way by which any domain and the social system as a whole can be threatened. We apply Galtung’s 
distinction between negative and positive peace (see Galtung and Jacobsen, 2000). The former refers to the absence 
of direct violence, the latter to the absence of indirect or structural violence, that is, the presence of conditions that 
eliminate the causes of violence and establish enduring peace. With low levels of negative peace in any domain (that 
is, high levels of violence), the system can become infected, vulnerable, and “tip” into becoming unsustainable. It 
can collapse. To be sustainable, the system must be designed to be less vulnerable. Now define positive peace as 
social system sustainability (positive peace = social system sustainability). Sustainability is characterized by a 
threshold level of inoculation, or immunity from threat.21 In principle, sustainability and its threshold can be 
measured with positive peace indicators of which there are very many by now, even if not universally agreed as yet. 
Successful positive peace efforts are captured by lower levels of violence, true, but the focus of these efforts does 
not lie with suppression of that which is destructive; rather, it lies with the upliftment of that which is constructive. 
The reason for this focus is that negative peace may result from mere repression of violence, leaving underlying 
causes of violence unaddressed. In contrast, positive peace redresses latent causes of violence to make violence 
superfluous and even unthinkable. 
 Negative peace, positive peace, and social system sustainability thus are linked within a common conceptual 
framework. The objective is to obtain hysteresis—a ratchet-effect—at each stage of successful institution and policy 
building so that there is no going back.22 At each stage, achievements are locked in, irreversibly. An ever-higher 
degree of stability is achieved until a threshold is crossed, and an invulnerable end-state of a stable, peaceful social 
system is obtained. Peace economics enters this framework because of the definition we gave it: It concerns the 
economic study and design of political, economic, and cultural institutions, their interrelations, and their policies to 
prevent, mitigate, or resolve any type of latent or actual destructive conflict within and between societies. 
 
4.2 Challenges 
 
The challenges for peace economics are many. Here, we focus on three aspects. First, peace economists must 
contribute to the provision of better measures of positive peace. Second, peace economists must re-engage in the 
discussion about what counts as “progress.” Third, peace economics must recover and reclaim its own visibility 
within economics! 
 Measurement of social phenomena depends upon the definition of the phenomenon itself. Definitions of peace 
                                                
21. Note our choice of “inoculation” and “immunity” over the more common term “resilience.” Resilience is a 
biological term that refers for instance to an ecosystem’s ability to bounce back and recover after collapse. But one 
does not want societies to collapse in the first place; one wants immunity to collapse so that resilience will not be 
necessary. “Resistance” would be a better term than “resilience.” 
22. Hysteresis is the dependence of a system state on its own history. 
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range from cessation of hostilities to the establishment of a just society. As noted, some definitions emphasize the 
negation of a status (especially of war); others highlight positive components of a peaceful environment. With 
Galtung, we refer to the first as ‘negative peace’ and to the latter as ‘positive peace’. Both need to be measured, but 
the measures needed are different. Measurement of negative peace and its effects can refer to a counterfactual state 
of the world wherein hostility did not take place. For example, negative peace is, for now, the conceptual basis of 
the Global Peace Index (GPI), developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), in Sydney, Australia. 
Presently, the GPI is a combined score consisting of measurements of 23 internal and external indicators mostly 
related to the absence of or threat to peace. This includes, for example, factors such as levels of violent crime, levels 
of military expenditure, and weapons availability.23 But the ultimate goal must be to develop a comprehensive and 
coherent set of positive peace (social sustainability) measures. Once an initial set of such measures exists, the 
operational key will be scalability, that is, indicators that can be collected for any arbitrarily-sized community, from 
village to nation. One problem is that if indicators are overly community-specific, it is unlikely that they can be 
generalized across all communities. A way around this is to start with top-level indicators, common to all 
communities, and then scale down to community-specifics by way of “satellite” measures. Because of their training 
related to data and data analysis, peace economists can make a useful contribution here. 
 A second fundamental issue relates to Boulding’s warning about “what is meant by economic progress,” as 
some varieties of progress can lead to the very chaos and violence that genuine economic progress is meant to 
prevent. As the International Monetary Fund has belatedly learned, economic growth at all cost will not do: For 
example, questions about equity of progress invariably enter the picture.24 At any given point in time, the state of a 
social system is the outcome of past interactions among political, economic, and cultural domains. It follows that the 
economic study of institutions and policies then has to take into account things that exceed the usual, narrow 
boundaries of economics. This makes peace economics a branch of economics enriched by contributions from many 
fields of study such as philosophy, politics, mathematics, psychology, and sociology. Unlike orthodox economics, 
peace economics is not obsessed with narrowly applying rational choice theory and its tools. Peace economics does 
not deny the relevance and usefulness of orthodoxy, but nor does it view orthodoxy as the only way to do science. 
Interdisciplinarity makes peace economics part of a broader peace science (Isard, 1988). 
 Third, peace economics needs to recover and reclaim its standing within economics itself. In this regard, it is 
helpful to list an alphabetized sample of great economists who have devoted considerable effort to think and write 
about the economics of peace, often in book-length treatments. It includes Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Boulding, F.Y. 
Edgeworth, John Kenneth Galbraith, John Harsanyi, Michael Intriligator, Walter Isard, John Maynard Keynes, 
Lawrence Klein, Wassily Leontief, Friedrich List, Karl Marx, Roger Myerson, Douglass North, Mancur Olson, 
                                                
23. Relating the GPI to economic indicators, Brauer and Tepper Marlin (2010) compute an increase in world 
economic output by about 9 percent, for the year 2007, consequent upon a simulated counterfactual state of 
complete worldwide nonviolence. Similarly, for 1960 to 2000, Caruso (2003) estimates the loss of potential gains 
from international trade for the United States because of sanctions—a form of economic violence—it imposed on 
potential trading partners. He estimates that in the counterfactual absence of sanctions, trade volumes between the 
United States and the unilaterally targeted countries would have been larger by 59 percent. 
24. See, e.g., Del Castillo (2008); Brauer and Dunne (forthcoming). 
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Vilfredo Pareto, A.C. Pigou, David Ricardo, Lionel Robbins, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Werner Sombart, Thomas 
Schelling, Adam Smith, Joseph Stigliz, Jan Tinbergen, Thorstein Veblen, Léon Walras, and Knut Wicksell—a 
surprisingly diverse assembly.25 Nonetheless, workaday economists today do not appear too much concerned with 
questions of peace, perhaps because they really do assume, as Boulding implied, that all economics is peace 
economics. Still, if the relevance of a subfield in economics is attested to by inclusion in the Journal of Economic 
Literature (JEL) classification scheme, then something is amiss. Work related to peace economics is captured 
mainly in subject codes D74 (conflict; conflict resolution; alliances), D78 (positive analysis of policymaking and 
implementation), and H56 (national security and war). As yet, there is no descriptor for peace economics as we have 
defined it. Nevertheless, peace economists today can count on a number of specialized outlets that consider their 
work, including the Journal of Conflict Resolution (since 1956), the Journal of Peace Research (since 1964), 
Conflict Management and Peace Science (since 1973), Defence and Peace Economics (since 1990), Peace 
Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy (since 1993), the Economics of Peace and Security Journal (since 
2006), and the International Journal of Development and Conflict (since 2011). Peace economics is a growing field 
of study. 
 
5. Summary 
 
In sum, we assert that while founded on positive precepts, peace economics is distinct for its normative character. Its 
focus lies on an economic understanding and of putting in place political, economic, and cultural structures that 
would prevent any type of violent conflict and its adverse consequences. Peace economics is about the maximization 
of positive peace rather than about minimization of negative peace. 
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